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Abstract 
 
 
An analysis of Australia’s level of compliance with the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (the Convention) according to theories of compliance, suggests that 
no single compliance theory can adequately explain both instances of violation and 
instances of compliance.  
Much of Australia’s violation of the Convention, and subsequently other international 
human rights treaties, stems from more recent legislative changes though Australia’s 
offshore processing initiatives.    
Collectively theories of compliance are useful for identifying the driving factors which 
govern Australia’s handling of international obligations under the Convention.  Liberal 
compliance theory indicates civil society and non-state actors are the most influential 
drivers ensuring the state is held accountable for upholding its obligations and 
responsibilities.  Constructivist compliance theory suggests the greatest pull towards non-
compliance is Australia’s notion of national identity which has influenced discriminatory 
policies throughout its history.  National identity remains an influential driver as evidenced 
by current politicisation of discussion surrounding refugees and asylum seekers in Australia 
and subsequent legislative agendas.  
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Introduction 
 
People are moving around the world at a faster rate than ever before not just for leisure 
but in response to political conflict, war, economic security, and natural disasters.  The 
number of those who involuntarily flee their country of origin and are forced to seek 
refuge elsewhere is increasing, leaving a significant group vulnerable to increased chances 
of exploitation and abuse.  With little or no legal protections outside their state of 
residence, access to safeguards and an adequate standard of living is severely diminished.  
This is a prominent feature in international relations rhetoric, as a states failure to extend 
protection undermines the universalism of human rights.  While these discussions are 
inclusive of all vulnerable persons and groups who reside outside their country of origin, 
this paper focuses on one of those groups, refugees and asylum seekers, as defined under 
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’ 
or ‘Convention’ hereafter).   
Refugee status under the Convention is determined on a well founded fear of persecution 
based on civil or political status.  While this status is determined on a threshold which 
includes a violation of human rights, it does not include hardship or lack of opportunity.1  
Therefore, while the term refugee is often used to incorrectly to describe persons in 
various circumstances, not all persons who have fled their home are refugees.2  Asylum 
seekers are those who seek official recognition of status as a refugee under the 
Convention.  
The Refugee Convention is the most comprehensive international human rights 
instrument for the rights of refugees.  Though the Refugee Convention and all other 
United Nations (UN) treaties mandate a universal application of human rights standards, 
states frequently fall short of full compliance to these treaties.   
This paper examines the extent to which Australia complies with the Refugee Convention 
and uses theories of compliance to reflect on the uptake of international human rights 
instruments.  In the case of Australia, failure to acknowledge compliance risks 
                                                             
1 Hathaway, James. The Law of Refugee Status. Vancouver: Butterworths Ltd., 1991. p.vi. 
2 For example, persons who have departed an inhabitable city due to an earthquake, or other natural or 
environmental disaster are not refugees by this definition.  Likewise, the definition does not cover 
‘internally displaced persons’ within a country of political conflict, it only applies to those who seek 
protection while outside their country of nationality.     
2 
 
undermining the foundations of an international system designed to uphold the 
fundamental rights and protections of refugees and asylum seekers.  By examining 
theories of compliance it is determined that no single theory can sufficiently explain 
Australia’s level of compliance to their obligations and responsibilities under the Refugee 
Convention.  Rather, components of the five theories discussed can assist in 
understanding which factors present the greatest influence in determining Australia’s 
level of compliance to the Refugee Convention.   
While there are numerous drivers, there are two factors which suggest the strongest pull 
towards non-compliance.  By examining the historical, social and political context of 
Australia’s broader immigration policies it becomes apparent that Australia’s compliance 
is heavily influenced by civil society and non-state actors and a constructed ideology of 
national identity. 
Criticism of Australia’s interpretation of the Convention stems mostly from changes made 
to domestic legislation as a result of the state’s offshore processing initiatives.  The 
Australian government primarily defends its actions as their sovereign right based on the 
three justifications: border control, national identity and national security.   
Those in opposition to the state’s stance argue that Australia’s legislation and policies 
around offshore processing violate, to varying degrees, critical provisions set forth in the 
Refugee Convention and more generally other human rights instruments and obligations 
as an international citizen under the UN charter.  It is asserted that various amendments 
to domestic legislation are discriminatory and at odds with the principle foundation of the 
Convention; that it is not illegal for persons to seek asylum and those who seek asylum, 
regardless of method of arrival, are entitled to basic rights.  While the Convention does 
allow for the detaining of refugees only when strictly necessary, Australia has been 
criticised for the mandatory and excessive use of detainment.3  Another prominent 
concern by opponents is that the practice of offshore processing at an excised location 
significantly increases the risk of a genuine refugee being returned to the country they 
have fled.  Collectively, these represent the greatest criticisms of Australia’s level of 
compliance to the Convention, with concern that they undermine both the foundations of 
                                                             
3 Bem, Kazimierz and Nina Field, Nic Maclellan, Sarah Meyer, Dr. Tony Morris. A Price Too High: the Cost of 
Australia's Approach to Asylum Seekers. Australia: a research project funded by A Just Australia, Oxfam 
Australia and Oxfam Novib, 2007.  Particularly for the mandatory detention of children.  For further 
information see http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/immigration/detention_rights.html.  
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the Convention and an international responsibility.  In addition, such breaches jeopardise 
other international treaties to which Australia is party, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).  
Australia is not alone with having to deal with this challenging, ever-changing balance 
between granting rights and protections for refugees on the one hand and the potential 
burden such accommodations place on the state on the other.  It is also faced with the 
fact that the illegal operation of people smuggling and trafficking is a profitable business 
for some, who depend on asylum seekers willing to risk a long boat journey, and even 
their lives, for a chance at state protection.  Many states face similar scenarios and 
globally countries with high refugee intake are watching with anticipation the outcome of 
Australia’s offshore processing solution as a means of dealing with this situation.   
This paper begins by providing some background to the Refugee Convention; including 
the evolution of the definition of refugee, the history and scope of the Convention, and 
the Convention in the context of international law.  Following this, an examination of 
theories of compliance used within international relations is provided.  Thirdly, non-
compliance with the Refugee Convention, and consequently other related international 
human rights obligations, is explored within Australia’s social, political and historical 
context.  Lastly, the violations are measured and analysed according to respective 
theories of compliance to gain an understanding of Australia’s driving factors towards 
compliance and non-compliance alike.   It becomes apparent that civil society and non-
state actors are the driver factors towards compliance while Australia’s constructed 
ideology of national identity is the strongest influence in non-compliance.    
Recognising the careful balance required to both protect refugee rights and demands 
placed on the state, an improved understanding of how compliance with the Refugee 
Convention has been negotiated within Australia will contribute to the pressing and 
topical dialogue on the challenges that states face in achieving compliance with their 
obligations to protect international refugees and uphold agreed to international human 
rights standards.  
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Part I. The Refugee Convention  
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”4 
While this precise definition of refugee did not evolve until the mid-twentieth century, 
refugee rhetoric was taking place half a century earlier with the definition of refugee 
evolving in both juridical and social realms.5     
Defining refugees from a legal point of view, a de jure perspective evolved to facilitate 
international movement of persons outside of their country of origin at a time when 
persons were not seen as an international responsibility if the state of origin failed to 
assume protection for them.6  Two significant migrations included the flight of more than 
one million Russians between 1917 and 1922, and hundreds of thousands of Armenians 
fleeing the Turkish government’s tyrannical oppression and war in the early 1920s.7   
By contrast, the social perspective was based on a de facto recognition.  The scope of this 
definition was to protect persons adversely affected by injustice making living in the state 
intolerable, due to a specific situation.8 
These two principles; state accountability and protection, are the essence of the 
Convention today.  
 
                                                             
4 Article 1(A)(2). 
5 Hathaway (1991). 
6 Hathaway (1991) p.3. 
7 Hathaway (1991) p.2. 
8 Hathaway (1991).p.4.  
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Scope of the Convention  
“The desire of European states to establish normative standards and control mechanisms 
to stem the arrival of immigrants perceived as non-contributing clashed head on with the 
enormity of a series of major population displacements within Europe during the early 
part of the twentieth century.”9 
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was a post World War 
II initiative, drafted between 1948 and 1951, for persons affected by events within Europe 
which occurred prior to 1 January 1951.10  It entered into force on 22 April, 1954.   
The Convention unified all previous international instruments relating to refugees and 
remains the most comprehensive codified international instrument pertaining to the 
status of refugees today.11  It incorporates principles embodied in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which promote the universality and 
interdependence, indivisibility and the interrelatedness of fundamental human rights.  
The foundation of the Convention draws on Article 14 of the UDHR, the provision that 
everyone has the right to seek asylum from persecution.12  Since the proclamation of the 
UDHR, the rights of humans have been further recognised through a number of 
international human rights conventions and covenants.   
As international migration became controlled and facilitated with the introduction of 
domestic immigration legislation, it was deemed necessary to mandate legal protection 
for persons who were involuntarily denaturalized.  The Convention highlights the rights of 
these persons as a highly vulnerable, marginalised group of individuals who are outside of 
their state of origin without any legal protection.  This protection was initially only 
available to those outside their state of origin, a provision of the Refugee Convention that 
remains today.13    
The Convention has had one amendment since coming into force in the form of the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol).  Due to further international 
                                                             
9 Hathaway (1991) p.2. 
10 Preamble. 
11 Preamble. 
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations Document A/RES/217. 10 December 1948. 
(UDHR). 
13 Internally displaced persons, persons who have been forced to leave their habitual residence but stay 
within state borders by definition, cannot be granted refugee status and subsequent treaty protection 
entitlements under the Refugee Convention.   
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refugee situations eventuating after the establishment of the Convention, the Protocol 
removed the geographical and temporal limitations of the Convention.   
The Convention in context of international law 
United Nations treaties play a unique role in global governance.  They set a universal 
codification of human rights standards and because of this, are often considered 
customary international law.14   
While customary international law assumes in theory a position of hard law as it forms a 
universal human rights constitution, in practice it can waver significantly between hard 
and soft law.  Soft law agreements fall short of the traditional definition of law; rules 
which have components of international law but are not legally binding.  This is an 
essential point as legally binding rules and institutions presume compliance in a way that 
non-legal, non-binding rules do not.15   
The Refugee Convention is voluntarily signed by a contracting state thus securing a 
promise to honour the obligations and responsibilities associated with the Convention.  
Because of this, it is considered to be binding even if there are no direct sanctions and 
membership can be withdrawn.16  Direct sanctions can however, come from breaches of 
provisions which are similarly embedded in other international instruments to which 
Australia is party.17  Australia could potentially face direct sanctions within the 
international community for breaches to agreed to treaties.18       
It is also relevant to discuss the Refugee Convention in relation to other international 
human rights treaties as asylum seekers and refugees have rights independent of the 
Refugee Convention under these other treaties.     
                                                             
14 Rules that come from a general practice accepted as law. 
15 Raustiala, Kal and Anne-Marie Slaughter. “International Law, International Relations and Compliance.” 
Chap. 28 in The Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlnaes and Thomas Risse and Beth 
Simmons, 538-558. London: Sage Publications, 2002. p.538. 
16 Guzman, Andrew T. and Timothy L. Meyer. “International Soft Law.” Journal of Legal Analysis 2 (2010): 
p.177. 
17 Some of these include: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
18 For example, breaching the provision which prohibits actions against torture as set for in CAT.  Such 
sanctions could include monetary fines, loss of UN membership, or a loss of seat on UN hearing 
committees.  
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It has been argued that international instruments which make claims of universal human 
rights limit state sovereignty in principle.19  However, all UN treaties are voluntarily 
implemented by the signing state and a UN committee such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  The UNHCR committee supervises the 
implementation and monitoring of the Convention through a mandate of non-coercive 
enforcement.20  States take it upon themselves to choose to become a signatory or party, 
and to fulfil obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.  States can 
strengthen and enhance credibility to their commitment to the Convention by formally 
adopting provisions and protections by incorporating them into domestic legislation and 
policy.21  Furthermore, similar to all UN human rights treaties, states are also free to 
denounce themselves from the Convention as per the Administrative section laid out in 
the treaty.22   
So whilst there is dialogue around how much sovereignty a given state has in the face of 
globalisation, the effectiveness of the Convention ultimately rests on the state’s 
implementation and enforcement of it.  It is recognised that the granting of asylum may 
place an unduly heavy burden on a given state and therefore manageable and practical 
solutions cannot be achieved without international cooperation.23  
  
Part II. Compliance theory 
“It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” – Louis Henkin 
The reality is that non-compliance to international law is common, particularly in the 
international human rights realm.24  Given the increasing number of human rights 
                                                             
19 Grugel, Jean and Nicola Piper. Critical Perspectives on Global Governance: Rights and regulation in 
governing regimes. London: Routledge, 2007.  See page 2 “It creates a kind of constitution that can be used 
as a vehicle for making claims and legitimizes non-state action on behalf of vulnerable groups”.  
20 Preamble. 
21 In some states such as the Netherlands, France and Switzerland ratification results in automatic 
incorporation into domestic legislation. 
22 A one year notice is required to retract a contract with the Refugee Convention. Article 44(2).  
23 Preamble. 
24 Moore, David H. “A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance.” Northwestern University Law Review 
97, no. 2 (Winter 2003): p.879. 
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instruments created since World War II non-compliance is prevalent, thus leading to 
discussion on why states comply or fail to comply with international treaties.25 
The question of what influences states to comply with international law is among the 
most perplexing in international relations.  This question is highly significant for human 
rights where vast amounts of resources, both administrative and monetary, go into 
producing robust and considered human rights treaties.  Compliance to the Refugee 
Convention for example cannot only provide legal protection but can ultimately 
determine one’s livelihood.  Understanding the motivations that influence states to 
comply with international human rights instruments can assist the UN with successful 
promotion and protection of human rights.  Understanding the factors is essential as non-
compliance threatens to undermine the foundations of the Convention.26  More widely, it 
undermines the entire UN human rights agenda.  Without an insight into the drivers of 
compliance, gauging the impact of the fifty thousand existing international treaties has 
little significance.27 
Compliance is defined in this section and five theories of compliance discussed within 
international relations discourse are summarised.  Compliance theories suggest reasons 
why states do or do not comply.  They are laid out here in order to provide a basis for 
analysing which factors have the greatest pull towards compliance and which have the 
strongest influence towards non-compliance for Australia in relation to the Convention.   
Defining compliance   
Oran Young’s definition of compliance is used in this paper and refers to the adherence to 
and conformity between the relevant actor’s behaviour and a specified rule.28  
Compliance is not a binary definition in that a state either complies or does not comply.  
Both compliance and non-compliance can exist in varying degrees.  Two concepts closely 
                                                             
25 Hathaway, Oona A. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference.” Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (June 
2002): 1935-2042. 
26 Burgstaller, Markus. Theories of Compliance with International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2005.p.2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Young, Oran R. Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
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linked and associated with determining levels of compliance are implementation and 
effectiveness.29    
As mentioned, the Refugee Convention relies on implementation which refers to putting 
treaty provisions into practice, primarily through domestic legislation and enforcement.30  
While implementation is a crucial step towards compliance, it is not always required, 
particularly where domestic practice is already in line with international treaty 
obligations.31   
Similarly, while effectiveness, defined as the extent to which a treaty alters behaviour to 
further the goals of the treaty,32 is often measured in association with levels of 
compliance, it is not directly correlated to compliance.  Treaties have been found to be 
effective even when compliance is low; and high compliance numbers do not always 
signify protection standards are met effectively.  
Theories on compliance put forth reasons why states either comply or do not comply with 
international governance.   Andrew Guzman suggests that “at present, the best source of 
theory relevant to international law and compliance comes not from legal scholarship, 
but from international relations”.33   
Though international relations theorists have attempted to examine and describe 
patterns of compliance, there is debate over whether theories can be clearly 
catalogued.34  Few studies have focused on compliance within the human rights realm.  
Most empirical studies of compliance have focused on measureable governance regimes 
like international political economy (IPE), where there is significant international value 
and pressure to be involved and included into the IPE system.35  This in part has to do 
with the generalisation which occurs in the discourse, whereby international law 
compliance theories often combine hard and soft law by including everything from non-
binding declarations to binding treaties. 
                                                             
29 Raustiala and Slaughter (2002) p.539. 
30 Ibid.    
31 Ibid. 
32 Keohane, Robert O. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. 
Boulder: Westview, 1989. 
33 Guzman, Andrew T. “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law.” California Law Review 90 (2002): 
p.1827. 
34 Hathaway (1991) p.5.  See also Burgstaller (2005) p.95. 
35 Grugel and Piper (2007). 
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Like the Refugee Convention itself, compliance theories are challenged in that they risk 
being too narrow as they try to canvas a wide number of factors and variables.  Though all 
of the theories do contain elements of philosophy, politics and sociology,36 all factors and 
every scenario possible cannot be included.  Narrowing the scope by examining a specific 
state and a particular Convention does not diminish the variables when considering 
Australia’s compliance with the Refugee Convention.   
A solid compliance theory should provide reasoning for why states comply with 
international treaties as well as why states partake in non-compliance by violating their 
obligations to international law.  Guzman notes that while theories explain instances of 
compliance, none of these approaches offer a comprehensive coverage of compliance 
with international human rights law,37 in that they do not explain instances of breach.38  
Below, the main theories of compliance in international law are highlighted.   
Realist theories of compliance   
Realist scholarship views international law as having little significant impact on state 
behaviour.  International law and global governance is assumed to be a system primarily 
driven and controlled by unitary states rather than a system above the state which is 
influenced by external institutions and international systems.39  States are driven by their 
own political agenda and either jockey for a position within the ‘international systemic 
power configuration’ of states driven by their own political agenda,40 or as a response to 
external threats if the state is already sitting within the elevated power structure of this 
international system.41  
While there are varying theories of this perspective on compliance and some argue a 
number of influential factors42 shape states’ behaviour towards compliance; norms are 
never a feature.  Markus Burgstaller notes that “the only rule applicable to the state is 
                                                             
36 Burgstaller (2005) p.95. 
37 Moore (2003) p.880. 
38 Guzman (2002) p.1844. 
39 Grugel and Piper (2007) p.5. 
40 Withana, Radhika. Power, Politics, Law: International Law and State Behaviour During International 
Crises. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. p.39. 
41 Burgstaller (2005) pp.96-98.  Based on Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe 
After the Cold War". International Security 15, no. 4 (1990):p.5-56. Reprinted in Michael E. Brown et al., 
eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1995.p.78-129. 
42 Such as power, economics, politics and foreign relations.  See Burgstaller (2005) p.96. 
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one of rationality as there is no such thing as justice or morality across borders.”43  
Regardless of different thoughts on factors, all perspectives agree that national interest 
and power take precedence.44    
Traditionally realism formed around these two main principles.  In the early twentieth 
century E.H. Carr explained the power relationships between states.  He suggested that 
international politics are not driven by global governance, reputation or norms but that 
“power is a decisive factor in every political situation . . .”.45  In addition, Andrew Guzman 
suggests that these two interests are the primary source of behaviour focused on 
absolute gain from cooperation.  If a state does not stand to gain as much as it could or 
more than that of another state, it will be more inclined to not comply.46   
So whilst Hans Morgenthau alluded to realism as the “rational theory of international 
politics”47 this perspective poses a genuine concern regarding the certainty and reliability 
of state compliance with the Refugee Convention.  It suggests states will only assume 
international cooperation and burden sharing when it is in their interest to do so, 
disregarding ‘obligations’ if the advantage outweighs adherence.48 
Realist theory would suggest that when a state enters into agreement with the 
Convention, it has a high level of freedom over the level of compliance which has the 
potential to greatly undermine the Convention.  This essentially cedes its universalism 
and becomes a mandate whose provision is solely in service of the state.49  It allows 
states to alter commitments to responsibilities rather than maintain compliance when 
circumstances change.  In addition, if a state has a certain level of established non-
compliance to the Convention or Protocol, such as a reservation in place, it decreases 
costs associated with a violation of compliance.50   
                                                             
43 Burgstaller (2005) p.97. 
44 From Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Stephen D. Krasner. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1999. In Guzman, Andrew T. “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law.” California Law 
Review 90 (2002): p.1841.  
45 Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939. New York: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1958.p235. 
46 Guzman (2002) p.1840. 
47 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th Edition. New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1973.p3. 
48 Henkin, Louis. How Nations Behave. 2nd Edition. New York: Colombia University Press, 1979. 
49 Guzman and Meyer (2010) p.171. 
50 Guzman, Andrew T. “The Design of International Agreements.” The European Journal of International Law 
16, no. 2 (2005): p.591. 
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Because the assumption of politics is based on power and national interest, there is 
inclination within this scholarship to suggest that international law does little to affect 
state behaviour, making compliance fickle.  Realists would not deny states often act in a 
manner consistent with international law, however compliance is more accurately 
thought of as having domestic policies consistent with international policy.   
Liberal theories of compliance   
The main principle which sets liberal theories of compliance apart from realist theories is 
the rejection of the assumption that compliance with international law is solely the 
decision of the unitary state.   
Contrary to realism, liberalism argues that states do not operate in silos; rather the 
concept of ‘international’ is considered to be an array of interactions and cooperation 
between citizens, between states and between global and local communities.  Thus, it 
argues that “states do not make decisions; people do”.51  The argument that international 
compliance emerges from bottom up domestic politics also differs to the realist argument 
of a top down approach where decisions are made by the state in the best interest of 
their citizens. 
Liberal compliance rhetoric is commonly bound with normative scholarship.  Whereas 
realists view international treaties as the product of powerful state agendas and 
underplay the role non-state actors, normative theory draws on the liberal principle 
which assumes international treaties are the product of transnational interactions, guided 
by a sense of justice and moral and ethical obligations.52    
Harold Koh has been influential in this perspective, arguing that norms are formed 
collectively through state, non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, 
and civil society interactions.53  Norms then become internalised at the national level thus 
contributing to the formation of state identity.54  Then norms get incorporated into 
                                                             
51 Hathaway (1991) p.5.  
52 Franck, Thomas. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
53 Koh, Harold H. “Transnational Legal Process.” Nebraska Law Review 75 (1996): 181-208. 
54 Ibid.  
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domestic legislation and policies, and become a factor in determining a state’s behaviour 
towards international compliance.55   
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Andrew Moravcsik also argue that the impact that non-state 
actors have on state compliance to international treaties is due to the internalisation of 
norms which takes place at the domestic level.56  Their work on domestic regime 
compliance compliments Koh’s argument by suggesting that it is the characteristics and 
domestic structure of the state that significantly determine compliance with international 
law.   
Slaughter and Moravcsik argue that the commitment to international compliance is a 
result of domestic politics which are representative of the views of the state as states 
reflect the individual interests in their policy and ideology.57  Slaughter notes that when 
applying this theory there is a variation between liberal and non-liberal states.  She notes 
that liberal states have a “. . . form of representative democracy, a market economy 
based on private property rights, and constitutional protection of civil and political 
rights”.58         
This theory stresses the role that non-state actors play including individuals or collectives 
of individuals within the state.  When government allows non-government actors to 
overtly advocate for rights, and norms are internalised, then the government, which is 
representative of the people, has domestic policies and legislation which are rights based 
(Simmons 2009; Koh 2005).59  Beth Simmons also emphasises the role of non-state actors 
noting that the transmission of norms at the domestic level can be influenced by regional 
networks and cooperation.60  Regional organisations, systems, and agreements which 
promote human rights standards help ensure that treaty provisions are put into practice.    
Therefore, in states where norms have not been internalised, non-compliance 
domestically would result in non-compliance internationally.  This theory suggests then, 
that if states have a domestic legislation inclusive of norms, a representative government 
                                                             
55 Koh (1996).  
56 Hathaway (1991) p.5.  
57 Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “International Law in a World of Liberal States.” European Journal of International 
Law 6, no. 4 (1995): 503-538. 
58 Slaughter (1995) p.509. 
59 Grugel and Piper (2007). 
60 Simmons, Beth. Mobilizing for Human Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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and judicial system which complies with rules of law, then they should have a higher level 
of compliance to the Refugee Convention. 
Because of the internalisation within the state, norm based treaties like the Refugee 
Convention are considered to be the strongest influential factor on state’s behaviour and 
compliance.  Based on this assumption, it is believed that UN Conventions create an 
international system of norms based governance whereby rights genuinely matter.     
Reputation theories of compliance   
Reputation theory assumes international law can affect state behaviour because states 
are concerned about their reputation and sanctions resulting from a violation of 
obligation.61  The theory sits midway between realist and liberalist theories of 
compliance, at times drawing on the realist concept of the self-interested state, 
otherwise drawing on the liberal principle of cooperation and the concept of normativity.   
It is generally assumed that when there is an increase of ‘costs’ for a violation, the level of 
compliance will also increase.62  There are typically greater costs associated with violating 
hard law than soft, which realists would consider to have little ‘compliance pull’ as it 
rarely has direct sanctions for a violation of compliance.  However, Andrew Guzman and 
Timothy Meyer (2010) note that the poor reputation a state may endure amongst the 
international community could prove to be a high enough cost to persuade it to comply.63   
Where states may consider calculations of cost-benefit analysis, there is often low cost 
and high benefit associated with belonging to an international community.  Following the 
norms of the community, in this case upholding responsibilities of the Convention, can 
enhance a state’s position within the community or allow them to maintain a well 
regarded status in an interconnected community of states.   
Not honouring obligations to the Convention can tarnish a state’s reputation because it 
demonstrates that it is prepared to breach its obligations and not fulfil its 
responsibilities.64  Liberal normative theory would suggest this is increasingly important; 
as a commitment to human rights standards is a key component of modern statehood, 
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demonstrates respect for justice and sends a message about a state’s ability to follow an 
international code of conduct.65  Jack Donnelly also adds that shame from what is 
perceived as norm violating behaviour can act as a significant incentive to commit to 
improving ones reputation as well.66 
However, Guzman draws on the self interest of the state and emphasises that states are 
more likely to comply when there is greater transparency of a violation.67  If no, or 
relatively few states, are likely to gain knowledge of a violation, this may present 
sufficient persuasion to engage in non-compliance if it is in the state’s best interest.  
Without other states’ knowledge of non-compliance, there is no loss of reputation.    
Guzman also suggests that in special circumstances, such as a national crisis, non-
compliance is viewed differently.68  In the time of crisis, a state may be able to retain a 
positive reputation if at other times they are able to comply with their obligations.   
Expanding on this, Ramos and Zartner suggest state compliance can additionally act as a 
means for self interests; that by establishing a strong reputation through demonstrating a 
commitment to human rights norms, makes achieving foreign policy goals easier if that 
action allows states to gain allegiance with both the international and domestic 
community.  If a state is seen to ignore international human rights protections and not 
follow other states’ compliance to treaties or allow for human rights breaches to occur 
domestically, its reputation can take a hit and have a direct impact on such things as 
securing foreign aid, investment and tourism; securing a bargaining position; obtaining 
leadership and gaining esteem for agenda setting; and inclusion in an international or 
regional organization.69   
Though there is a spectrum of arguments for compliance amongst reputational 
perspectives, it is agreed that having a strong human rights record is a relevant factor for 
a state to maintain a positive international reputation.   
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Constructivist theories of compliance   
In the 1990s constructivist approaches to international relations began to emerge.70  
Constructivists argue that international ‘reality’ is socially constructed through 
interactions, or as Alexander Wendt described it, “anarchy is what states make of it”.71  
Whilst his use of the word anarchy may be thought to touch on realist principles like 
sovereignty, Wendt argues state power was never a concrete concept, but rather a non-
tangible concept which was constructed by individuals.72  The theory has expanded from 
earlier works of Hedley Bull, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie.73  Ruggie particularly 
laid the foundation for discussions on the role of variable and constructed factors in the 
international system including concepts such as identity, norms, aspirations and 
ideologies.  
Concepts which are commonly discussed in the context of the Refugee Convention: 
power, sovereignty, compliance, and norms are all argued to be construed meanings 
along with the structure in which they present themselves.  International organisations 
like the UN and international instruments are given a meaning and a value by social 
dialogue and interaction. 
Martha Finnemore suggests that states’ behaviour cannot be viewed as independent but 
as a response to ideas and concepts which have been construed through social 
interactions.  Reality and meaning are part of a continual evolutionary process impacted 
by social and political global interactions.  Therefore, concepts such as international 
treaties are not a given tool or legal instrument to which states must adhere but rather an 
idea, a system, which has been formed through the constant process of interaction.  It is a 
tool for discussing norm and fact.74   
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Therefore, the concept of compliance would have been developed through a system of 
shared knowledge rather than based on the realist assumption of ‘rational calculation’.75  
This would suggest that compliance levels would not be based on consequences of non-
compliance, nor on cost-benefit analysis.76    
Managerial theory of compliance   
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes have developed the managerial theory of 
compliance.  They present similar elements to Henkin, suggesting that if a state enters 
into an international agreement they are likely to comply with it.77  They provide three 
main reasons for compliance; one is that there is a strong sense of obligation to comply 
with the provisions of the Convention as it is voluntarily consented to rather than 
coerced.  They also note that compliance is efficient, and non-compliance is a high cost to 
the state.  Thirdly, they argue that compliance is a result of state interactions and 
cooperation where processes of justification, discourse and persuasion are played out.78  
Because of this, “the treaty as finally signed and presented for ratification is . . . likely to 
be based on considered and well developed conceptions of national interest that have 
themselves been shaped to some extent by the preparatory and negotiating process.”79   
Chayes and Chayes suggest that coercive threats of enforcement are unlikely to bring 
about compliance nor is the fear of reputational loss because compliance results from a 
proactive engagement with the international community.  They suggest that if 
reputational pull accounts for anything, it is that states want to engage in and cooperate 
with the international community rather than be seen to have power.  Inclusion in the 
international community, they argue, is the new sovereignty.80   
However, where there is non-compliance, they argue it is largely the result of treaty 
language ambiguity and parameters of the treaty which place limitations on the capacity 
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of states to carry out obligations.81  Additionally, they argue that strict compliance is 
unnecessary so long as the provisions of the treaty are maintained to an acceptable level 
as determined by the international community.  It is also thought that where certain 
areas of state compliance to international treaties in general may be more contentious, 
compliance may be reported on differently than what it is in actuality to keep secrecy in 
the name of national security.  In other words, non-compliance can exist and should not 
automatically be assumed to signify a complete loss of protection and safeguard. 
Circumstances can change after an agreement is drawn, as seen with further population 
displacement after World War II and the need for broadening the definition of refugee 
through the Protocol.  Chayes and Chayes argue that well developed treaties have the 
capability to evolve to meet the needs of shifting interests.   
While there are many theories of compliance, those discussed here give a sufficient 
overview within which the Convention and the level of compliance it receives can be 
analysed.    
 
Part III. Australia’s challenges to the Refugee Convention  
This section provides an historical account of Australia’s relationship to the Refugee 
Convention.  Through specific examples, it identifies and examines instances of non-
compliance to the Convention.  Additionally, some violations are compounded because of 
Australia’s obligations under other core human rights instruments.  Efforts to remedy 
certain violations through proposed changes to domestic legislation are noted.   
Australia has voluntarily consented to signing the Refugee Convention and is party to core 
international human rights treaties.82  Whilst, unlike domestic law, there are no direct 
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sanctions for a violation, any state party to an international treaty agrees to be bound to 
upholding certain obligations.  Given Australia’s membership to other international 
human rights treaties, the state has consented to the broader responsibility for the 
promotion and protection of human rights standards.  All responsibilities are agreed to be 
carried out in “good faith” and with the  complying with rights outlined in the Refugee 
Convention does not automatically fulfil Australia’s responsibility to protect asylum 
seekers’ and refugees’ rights under their other commitments.83     
The UNHCR recognises that full ratification is not always a smooth and quick process and 
may be unachievable initially.84  Due to this, and because circumstances vary from state 
to state, the UNHRCR works alongside the state to progress towards ratification and 
compliance.   
There are two clauses within the Convention which allow the state to proactively mediate 
the risks of violation towards compliance.  At the time of signature, ratification, or 
accession, if it is known that obligations cannot be upheld, particularly where domestic 
legislation is inconsistent, a state can make reservations to certain provisions.85  Whilst 
some compliance is better than none, with each reservation, the value of the overall 
instrument diminishes.  In addition, reservations can weaken states’ credibility as it 
demonstrates a lesser level of commitment to the rights of refugees.86  As Australia 
declared no reservations at the time of ratification, it is bound to the Refugee Convention 
in its entirety.   
The second clause concerns contracted states and permits withdrawal from the 
Convention shall it be deemed necessary.87  While there have been calls within Australia 
for the state to withdraw, Australia would still be obliged to uphold other international 
obligations and obligations under the UN charter.  There would be serious ramifications 
for the human rights protections of asylum seekers and refugees if states withdrew from 
the Convention. 
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The first aspect of compliance with the Refugee Convention is ratification as it signals the 
willingness to comply by implementing and enforcing refugee protection into domestic 
legislation.  Yet given Young’s definition, Australia cannot be said to be fully compliant 
simply based on the fact that they have ratified the Refugee Convention. 
While it is important to consider the historical political context, current refugee debate 
within Australia overwhelmingly stems from more recent offshore processing initiatives.  
Australia puts forth the argument that offshore legislation and policy making is based on 
the right to sovereignty and the protection of security and national identity.  Refugee 
advocates and other party countries express concern that Australian domestic legislation 
is lacking compatibility not only with provisions set forth in the Refugee Convention but 
that they are in violation of a number of international treaties, thus non-complying with 
fundamental human rights standards.  The majority of violations fall under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 
The right to seek asylum  
An asylum seeker is a person seeking official recognition of status as a refugee under the 
Refugee Convention.  They are commonly labelled as illegal immigrants or queue jumpers 
for not complying with Australian law or for not having official documentation upon 
entry.  However, under the Convention, an asylum seeker has the right to seek asylum 
and have their claim processed to determine refugee status.  They are permitted to stay 
in Australia until that decision is made and are not illegally in Australia unless it has been 
determined that they do not meet the criteria set forth in the Convention.88    
The term queue jumpers also suggests a disregard for Australia’s system of refugee 
recognition in that asylum seekers are taking the places of those with existing UNHCR 
refugee status waiting in camps overseas to be resettled in Australia.  However, along 
with the yearly offshore resettlement quota, Australia also has an onshore obligation, for 
those who seek asylum after arrival.  In reality, UNHCR services are not always accessible 
in the country from which a refugee has come.  They are often forced to leave their home 
without official documents and in many cases cannot get these documents from the 
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government.  The Convention notes that refugees should not be unfairly discriminated 
against because of this.  Therefore, not only does Australia have the obligation under the 
Convention to not discriminate against asylum seekers, it also has the responsibility to 
not discriminate based on method of arrival.     
However, over the last decade Australia has passed legislation to make it more difficult 
for asylum seekers to qualify for asylum as refugees under Australia’s Migration Act 1958.  
Rather, those who may qualify for protection under the Refugee Convention could be 
turned away through a handful of changes in domestic legislation which became part of 
offshore processing initiatives. 
The Pacific Solution 
In 2001 the Howard Government made ‘unauthorised’ asylum a significant campaign 
issue with what became known as the Tampa incident, by refusing to allow a Norwegian 
vessel, MV Tampa, carrying over four hundred asylum seekers into its territorial waters.  
Though the Keating Government implemented the practice of mandatory detention (also 
a violation to be discussed later), it was due to this incident that Australia’s legal 
obligations towards asylum seekers under the Refugee Convention changed.89   
Upon securing the election, the promise to get tough on ‘illegal immigration’ was fast-
tracked and implemented through multiple changes to legislation.  At the last session of 
Parliament for the year, seven bills affecting refugees were passed by Parliament which 
collectively became known as the Pacific Solution.90  Three of the Bills essentially gave the 
Pacific Solution legislative effect by amending the Migration Act 1958.  Both the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 and the Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001 excised Australian 
territory from the migration zone.     
Excision was highlighted with the Tampa incident in that under the Refugee Convention, 
the four hundred plus asylum seekers may have been eligible for protection visas and 
access to the judicial review system upon their entry into Australian territorial waters.  A 
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few days after the MV Tampa had collected the asylum seekers, and a day after it had 
issued a distress signal based on the fact it was not receiving any assistance from 
Australia and was carrying a significant amount of passengers over the vessels capacity, 
the vessel entered Australian territorial waters near Christmas Island.  The same day 
border protection legislation was introduced before Parliament and Christmas Island, 
where the MV Tampa asylum seekers were eventually taken, had legally been placed 
outside of the migration zone with the proposed amendments.   
With Christmas Island deemed by law to be outside of Australian territory, asylum seekers 
were not automatically entitled to any rights or protections set forth in the Convention 
that asylum seekers are supposed to be granted upon arrival.  Particularly, a number of 
visa subclasses were created, whereby asylum seekers were now granted temporary 
protection visas (TPV) which gave temporary residence and limited access to services and 
limited entitlements.    
Additional legislation91 passed under the Pacific Solution to allow for increased powers of 
interception (coined ‘turning back boats’) by Australian authorities outside their territorial 
sea boundary.  This amendment essentially validated the actions of the Australian 
government dictating the vessel movements and controlling the movements of the 
asylum seekers on board the MV Tampa.92   
Four remaining Acts93 sought “to narrow the definition of a refugee and restrict 
independent judicial scrutiny and review of administrative decisions”.94  With these 
remaining Acts, Australia was in effect violating their responsibility to the Refugee 
Convention given their legal obligations within their territory, as well as for actions taken 
outside their territory in international waters.95  
Though the handling of the incident was heavily criticised internationally by human rights 
groups and the UNHCR, the election campaigning and subsequent legislation 
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amendments occurred in the height of 9/11 where the notion of securing the nation and 
territorial integrity received widespread public support within Australia.96   
The construction of ‘boat’ people and their threat to national security by the Howard 
government has been the subject of much analysis and discussion.97  Howard’s much 
repeated promise “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come”98 was delivered with the Pacific Solution.  Howard’s sentiments were in 
direct violation of the foundation of the Convention.   
When the Rudd Government was successful in winning the 2007 election the Pacific 
Solution essentially came to an end as part of a new approach to foreign policy.99  Though 
the new government maintained its commitment to a tight border security regime, Rudd 
ran his campaign with a new focus on Australia’s obligations to ‘unauthorised’ asylum 
seekers by criticising the harsh and inhumane treatment of those held in detention 
centres under the Howard government; noting the damage which had been done to 
Australia’s reputation.100  Temporary protection visas were abolished, a target of less 
than three months was put on assessing claims, offshore processing was halted and the 
government played an increasingly active part in the global governance arena, including 
re-engaging with the UNHCR, running for position of vice-chair and noting the approving 
remarks made by the UNHCR on changes made to the refugee policies.101   
David Manne suggests that the changes to legislation were fruitless in actual deterrence 
of ‘boat arrivals’ as offshore processing was the main deterrent.102  By 2010 high public 
interest in ‘unauthorised’ asylum seekers (attempting to arrive without a valid visa or 
authorisation) had risen again to become a contested political issue between the Gillard 
government and the opposition party.  As there had been an increase in boats carrying 
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asylum seekers into Australian waters, the government was criticised for having soft 
border policies.   
The Malaysia Solution 
In the latest federal election, Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott engaged the country again in a 
normative discussion on the politics of asylum in Australia; with both sides suggesting an 
asylum policy which would involve suspending compliance with international obligations 
towards both the Refugee Convention and other human rights treaties.103  Matt 
McDonald suggests that both parties’ call for an open debate on the matter calls into 
question the normative commitment to these obligations. 104  Tolerating a discussion on 
the threat to national security and prejudice against asylum seekers was a way of 
undermining Australia’s international obligations and responsibilities.  
As Gillard replaced Rudd, who faced the federal election with low opinion polling in part 
due to his softer stance on refugees and asylum seekers, Gillard proposed a regional 
processing framework which she coined “a long term solution” to address two concerns 
including deterring people risking their lives in boats at sea and ending the criminal 
behaviour of a people-smuggling business which is profiting off of desperation.105  In the 
lead up to the proposals, Gillard often commented “Australians are concerned when they 
see boats on our horizons” and Australians “don’t want boats leaving foreign shores to 
journey here”.106  Gillard’s statements suggest a strategy for both appeasing those 
concerned about Australia’s obligations to asylum seekers and those concerned about 
national security.   
Initial discussions to set up a regional offshore processing centre with East Timor and 
Papua New Guinea failed to eventuate.  Meanwhile, the opposition was advocating for a 
deal to be made with Nauru, the most recent member to the Refugee Convention, and 
incidentally where one of the offshore processing centres was established under the 
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Howard government.107  In mid 2011, Gillard’s government announced the Malaysia 
Solution, an arrangement whereby Australia would transfer up to 800 offshore asylum 
seekers to Malaysia for processing and in return accept up to 1000 UNHCR determined 
refugees per year for four consecutive years.108   
However in a landmark case the Australian High Court (the Court) ordered an immediate 
injunction and later ruled the agreement to be unlawful after proceedings were launched 
by David Manne, representing 42 asylum seekers, of which six were unaccompanied 
minors.  The Court found that the proposal by the government was unlawful.   
The Court found that under s198(A) of the Migration Act 1958, the Minister cannot validly 
declare a country to send asylum seekers to for processing, when that country is not 
legally bound, domestically or internationally, to a human rights framework that assesses 
the need for protection.109  Malaysia is not legally bound to provide the access and 
protections that the Migration Act 1958 requires, nor is Malaysia a party to the Refugee 
Convention or Protocol.110 
Secondly, the Court found that the general powers of removal of “unlawful non-citizens” 
under the Migration Act 1958 cannot be used when the Migration Act 1958 “has made 
specific provision for the taking of asylum seekers who are offshore entry persons and 
whose claims have not been processed, to another country, and has specified particular 
statutory criteria that the country of removal must meet.”111 
The decision, therefore, came down to Malaysia’s lack of fundamental human rights 
measures as there was no legal guarantee that refugee and asylum seekers’ rights would 
be protected.112           
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Non-refoulement     
While the Malaysia Solution was deemed unlawful in part due to Malaysia having no legal 
guarantee for protection, the agreement exposed Australia to be in violation of Article 33, 
often considered the most important provision of the Refugee Convention.  Article 33 
prohibits a state from returning a person to a place where they might be tortured or face 
persecution, or where life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, or membership of a particular group or political opinion.113 
Australia was deemed by the Court to not be upholding their international obligation 
towards this provision by proposing to send asylum seekers to Malaysia, a country where 
protection measures for non-refoulement do not exist.   
Freedom from discrimination    
Australia’s amendments made to legislation under the Pacific Solution created categories 
of visas which discriminate based on method of arrival by differentiating between asylum 
seekers who arrive by boat to excised territories and those who arrive by plane.  
Regardless of how a person arrives, according to the Convention they may be a genuine 
refugee and thus should not be discriminated against by virtue of this.  The Convention 
clearly states that penalties should not be imposed due to illegal presence or entry.114 
The Refugee Convention additionally notes that the contracting state shall apply 
provisions of the Convention without discrimination as to race, religion or country of 
origin.115  This provision draws on the broader UDHR provision that all individuals shall 
enjoy fundamental human rights and freedoms without discrimination.116  No state can 
declare a reservation to this provision under the Refugee Convention.  Additionally this 
provision is set forth in other core international human rights treaties which Australia is 
party to.  Yet despite this, discrimination can be seen at various levels. 
Australia’s discriminatory practice in policy making and domestic immigration legislation 
versus their claimed right to state sovereignty, border security and national identity, is 
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one of the most contested arguments in terms of the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers.    
Anthony Burke suggests that security discourse is deep seated and the latest reiteration 
post 9/11 has actually long defined an Australia where “borderphobia” is part of the 
Australian national identity.117 
Australia has always relied on immigration to populate its shores.  It is considered a 
receiving state and is one of few countries to have a formalised programme of permanent 
immigration.118  The estimated resident population of Australia is 22 million people. Of 
this population, almost one quarter was born overseas and additionally it has the highest 
per capita intake of refugees internationally.119   
Yet whilst Australia has responded to the international refugee situation since 1921, 
history has been one of exclusion as much as inclusion.120  From early on, the 
development of Australian immigration policy has always focused on what Australia’s 
national identity should entail.  The first Prime Minister of the federal parliament Edmund 
Barton noted that one of most pressing matters was in regards to the future of ‘white 
Australia’.121  White Australia Policy would continue to be influential in the development 
of immigration policy for most of the twentieth century, until 1975.    
Discrimination towards particular ethnic groups was one of the strongest influences in 
melding the Australian colonies together as Australia guarded itself from “Asiatic 
immigration”, the “yellow peril” and “hordes from the north”.122  Exclusionary policies 
were established with the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, the first law enacted by the 
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government, followed by the Naturalization Act 1903 whereby non-Europeans were 
denied the possibility of naturalization.123 
Initially after World War II in 1946, when the International Refugee Organisation124 was 
set up to deal with Europeans who had been displaced by the war, Australia refrained 
from voting at the UN General Assembly due to the concern that it would bring into 
Australia a great number of non-Caucasians.125  However, as the intake of migrants from 
the United Kingdom could not meet the demand for them, refugees were 
reconsidered.126      
Though exact figures are difficult to obtain on refugee intake during this time, it is 
thought that approximately 170,000 refugees entered Australia between 1947 and 1952 
through this scheme.127  However, due to strict health requirements, Australia earned an 
international reputation of using refugees to fill labour shortage, rather than sharing in 
the international cooperation of protection.128  This move towards increasing refugee 
uptake during this time set the tone for future refugee policy and as the intake met 
immigration needs the White Australian Policy began to slowly dismantle.  
The Department of Immigration today considers Australia’s “first step towards a non-
discrimination policy” to be the revoking of deportation orders issued under the 1949 
War-time Refugees Removal Act.129  In 1950 Australia was instrumental in helping 
establish the UNHCR and was one of the first nations to sign the Refugee Convention.  
Over the next twenty years nearly 200,000 refugees entered Australia, though under the 
definition of refugee at the time, they were not protected under the Convention.130  
Australia did not become a signatory to the 1967 Protocol until 1973.   
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During this time, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was replaced by the Migration Act 
1958, which saw some of the discriminatory provisions abolished.131  In the early 1970s 
the Whitlam Government formally dismantled White Australia Policy to follow suit with 
many other western countries at the time and make a stance on racial discrimination.132  
In 1975 Australia furthered this stance by becoming party to the International Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).133  
In light of signing CERD, contention still existed as ill harboured feelings were seen with 
the large intake of Vietnamese refugees after the fall of Saigon and communist victory.  
So whilst immigration and non-discrimination policy in government was advancing, there 
were also increased public fears of the high refugee intake.134  It is thought that the term 
‘boat people’ was first used during this time in reference to the Vietnamese refugees 
noticeably arriving by boat.135  To acknowledge the significant outflow of refugees in the 
region during this time the UNHCR established a resettlement program, the Orderly 
Departure Program, which aimed to settle refugees in a more orderly fashion and to 
decrease those seeking asylum via boats.  Negotiations took place between the UNHCR, 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Australia to resettle over 50,000 refugees.136  
Robert Manne described this scheme as a policy and public achievement: 
“Australians were easily panicked by the spontaneous arrival of a small number of boats. 
They were comfortable and relaxed about a far larger refugee program under 
government control.” 
This trend continued in the following years as Hawke’s Labor government increased the 
number of Asian migrants who were able to join their family through another initiative, 
the Family Reunion Programme.137  However, within time, in the early 1990s the then 
opposition leader John Howard argued that curbing Asian immigration would be in 
Australia’s immediate interest.138  Backing this, in 1996 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
Party was formed and ran an anti-immigration, anti-multicultural platform publicly 
dismissing government immigration policies which had been established over the 
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previous twenty five years.  The One Nation Party garnered significant support as it 
received nearly twenty five percent of the vote in the 1998 Queensland State Election.  
“I and many Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed, and that of 
multiculturalism abolished . . . if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should 
have the right to have a say in who comes into my country.”139 
Whilst immigration policy and Australian politics have been heavily intertwined 
throughout history, ‘unauthorised’ asylum did not become a central electoral issue until 
the Australian federal election campaign in 2001, and again in 2010.  Labour and Liberal 
both spoke of the securitization and the threat to national security and national values 
that ‘unauthorised’ asylum seeking present140 with Manne calling it the largest political 
and ideological issue to divide the Left from the Right.141    
While the Refugee Convention allows for discretion in that certain individuals may be 
excluded from protection under the Refugee Convention particularly those who have 
committed crimes against peace, a war crime, crimes against humanity or a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge, it does not allow for a blanket discrimination 
based on ethnicity, race or nationality. 
Throughout the early 2000s whilst asylum seekers were fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, national security gradually became an 
extension of the national identity debate and has become prevalent discourse in 
Australian society and politics post 9/11.  Member of Parliament Bruce Baird said anti-
Muslim sentiment in particular had risen since the 2001 attacks and the 2002 bombings in 
Bali.142  This anti-Muslim sentiment was exacerbated by heightened sensitivities towards 
terrorism at the time.  Though required under the Convention to assess the claims of all 
refugees without racial discrimination, ethnic groups stemming from countries with 
known or suspected links to terrorism were increasingly discriminated against. The 
majority of those seeking asylum in Australia at this time were fleeing from Sri Lanka and 
Afghanistan.  Given the perceived security threat that “crime and terrorism are 
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international in scope”,143 asylum applications for those two countries were temporarily 
suspended by the Rudd government while they investigated changing security 
circumstances in those countries.144  This decision by Australia was in violation of the 
Refugee Convention.  After lengthy consultation with the UNHCR, the temporary ban on 
Sri Lankan applications was lifted, while the freeze remained for Afghan applications for 
several months longer.  Leader of the opposition Tony Abbott used this as a political 
platform to announce Liberal’s ‘action plan’ which would see the return of Howard era 
asylum policies and prevent an undermining of the Australian way of life. Abbott thus 
linked refugees and the threat of terrorism and questioned their values and willingness to 
incorporate Australian national values into their lives.145  Support for these sentiments 
was most distressingly witnessed during the 2005 Sydney riots when demonstrators wore 
t-shirts which read ‘ethnic cleansing unit’ and chanted ‘Lebs go home’.146  
Recently, when asked whether there was anti-Islamic or xenophobic discrimination in the 
policies Abbott would like to reinstate against the 3,500 “boat people” when there are 
50,000 United States and United Kingdom overstayers in Australia, Abbott emphasised 
that the policy was about arriving with documents and legal and credible papers.147  This 
response illustrates a complete failure to understand both the refugee situation148 and 
the provisions of Article 33(1)149 of the Convention.   
Matt McDonald argues that the approach of political debate seen in the 2001 and 2010 
elections encourages exclusionary views of asylum seekers, and perpetuates it as an issue 
of security using distinct imagery and language to illustrate their threat.150  He suggests 
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that the campaigning has demonstrated an ease in mobilising the issue of securitization 
of asylum amongst Australian society and culture.  He thinks and that those beliefs are 
not indicative of the society or culture but it has created a fear such that policy has begun 
to resonate with a relatively large population of Australia.151  
The UNHCR is also critical of asylum being viewed through a security prism in many parts 
of the world resulting in states reinforcing control measures beyond their own territory 
and at borders.152 
Mandatory detention  
Under Australian legislation all non-citizens who do not hold valid visas are mandatorily 
detained.  Most asylum seekers who arrive by boat do not hold authorised visas for entry 
even though they may be genuine refugees.  The Refugee Convention states that 
detention and any restriction of movement should be enforced only when necessary and 
for a reasonable amount of time.153   
Australia is the only Western country that mandatorily detains asylum seekers while 
determining status, processing a claim, and or prior to deportation.154  As late as 2007 
Australia allowed for indefinite detention of asylum seekers.155  In 2003 Jane McAdam 
wrote “Australia’s laws regulating the reception and processing of asylum seekers are 
uniquely draconian in the western world.”156  While Australia has the highest refugee 
intake per capita, offshore arrival of asylum seekers is small in comparison with other 
nations such as Germany, Canada, France and the Netherlands.157   
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The UNHCR notes 
It frequently occurs that the necessary distinction is not made either in law or 
administrative practice between asylum seekers and ordinary aliens seeking to 
enter the territory.  The absence of such a distinction may, and in many cases 
does, lead to asylum seekers being punished and detained for illegal entry in the 
same manner as ordinary aliens.158 
Australia’s policy and practice of mandatory detention, has been criticised in the past for 
non-compliance of agreed to UN recommendations on international protection.159  An 
investigation into and report on the mandatory detention of asylum seekers stated that 
there were significant problems with the practice, yet did credit Australia for some 
improvements to detention policy.160  
Although improvements have been made to some conditions of detention, Australia’s 
policy of mandatory detention continues to place Australia in violation of numerous other 
international treaties and guidelines.  For example, arbitrary detention, whereby there is 
no legal reason to validate it161 is protected under both ICCPR and CAT.   
In cases brought before the Federal Court, it was determined that the likelihood of 
torture or death does not have to be a consideration in the decision to remove ‘unlawful’ 
persons from the state.162  Whilst a provision of the Refugee Convention requires release 
from detention as soon as reasonably possible,163 and this requirement forms a 
subsection of the Migration Act, consideration for what may certainly occur upon release 
does not have to be taken into account.164  
Unity of the family as a natural and fundamental group unit of society is a fundamental 
principle of international human rights treaties, recommending that government take all 
practical measures to ensure unity of the family is maintained.  Particular protection for 
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children and girls as vulnerable groups with reference to guardianship is outlined in 
various treaties.  In the case of asylum children, the state is meant to act as their legal 
guardian and consider the best interests of the child.165  Australia’s system of mandatory 
detention for children has been heavily criticised for not bearing in mind these interests 
and for being “fundamentally inconsistent” with CRC.  Indefinite and mandatory 
detention of children undermines provisions which safeguard detention of children as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time possible.166 
Right to equal access  
Prior to legislation being passed under the Pacific Solution, there was no real distinction 
between visas which were granted for offshore or onshore refugees.  All visas gave 
entitlement for permanent residency, with no restrictions to access the services that 
other Australian permanent residence holders were entitled to.  Legislative changes made 
under the Pacific Solution create different visa categories for asylum seekers depending 
on manner of arrival. 
Despite the Convention prohibiting discrimination against anyone on the basis of refugee 
status, these changes limited access to the courts for review of administrative decisions 
on refugee status and access to legal advice for asylum seekers.   
Under the Pacific Solution, a privative clause was enacted as section 474 of the Migration 
Act 1958.167  This clause creates a process whereby decisions made under the Migration 
Act are deemed as privative clause decisions in that decisions under the administrative 
review are deemed to be final and conclusive, and cannot be subject to a judicial review; 
therefore cannot be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called into 
question in any court.168    
Additionally, legal advice is not routinely offered to asylum seekers unless it is proactively 
sought by the asylum seeker.  Migration officers are not obliged to inform asylum seekers 
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of their rights in applying for refugee status.  The changes made to the visa processing 
system have created a more complex system including a demanding administrative 
process and time limits on initialising a visa application.  Legal advice is often necessary to 
comprehend the process and needed by the asylum seeker throughout the duration of 
the process.  The Australian Human Rights Commission criticised the government for the 
lack of legal availability and assistance and made numerous recommendations to improve 
access to legal advice for asylum seekers in detention, including availability of materials 
transcribed into first languages.169   
The Convention states that if an asylum seeker’s status is not regularised, the state should 
allow access to facilities to obtain admission into another country (as part of the non-
refoulement agreement); however, under the Howard government, access to these 
facilities was also criticised for being virtually non-existent.170   
As mistakes can and do occur, access to a judicial review including the right to appeal can 
be crucial when a person is potentially faced with a life or death decision based on 
protection or refoulement. 
International community  
Australia has the sovereign right as a nation to determine who it offers protection to.  
Therefore, to an extent, non-selection of an offshore asylum seeker does not violate state 
obligations solely under the Refugee Convention.  It is different for onshore asylum 
seekers who must be reviewed for refugee status and be provided protection should they 
meet criteria as set forth in the Convention. 
While the Convention mandates the safeguards, it does not prescribe the process for 
refugee determination.  The development and interpretation of domestic laws to adhere 
to international human rights obligations are at the discretion of the Australian executive, 
legislature and judiciary.171    
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The UN Human Rights Council carries out a Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the human 
rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years.172  It provides an 
opportunity for States to declare what actions have been taken to improve human rights 
situations in their countries.  In addition to the government report, independent human 
rights experts and groups and other stakeholders can also submit reports which are often 
self-critical of violations to international human rights treaties.  The UPR also includes an 
international sharing of best human rights practices. 
The UPR assesses to what extent states uphold their international human rights 
obligations by measuring the UDHR and all UN human rights instruments which have 
been ratified by the state against domestic legislation, policies and programmes which 
are relevant to provisions set forth in those instruments.   
Information released in December 2011 shows that the number one issue raised in the 
outcome report of Australia’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) were inconsistencies at the 
federal, state and territory levels in relation to non-compliance with international 
instruments.  Thirty seven recommendations were made to assist with strengthening 
cohesiveness to international instruments.173  Recommendation points 18-21 and 121-
140 all recommend Australia bring domestic legislation and practice in line with 
international obligations with the latter recommendations relating specifically to 
obligations under the Refugee Convention.   
An umbrella of general inconsistencies with anti-discrimination legislation were noted.174  
The report referred to the recommendations of Special Rapporteurs and treaty bodies to 
enact a human rights bill which would ensure domestic and international consistencies 
prior to any legislative enactment (Australia’s response is discussed below) and sought 
the Government’s plans to address this issue.  Prior to the outcome report, during 
Australia’s Universal Period Review forum, questions were asked about specific measures 
                                                             
172 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Universal Periodic Review.” 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (accessed 4 January 2012). 
173 This includes recommendations for removing reservations and ratification as well as compliance to 
existing treaties.  See database of UPR recommendations at http://www.upr-
info.org/database/index.php?&limit=0&f_SUR=&f_SMR=&order=&orderDir=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=28
&searchReco=&resultMax=25&response=&action_type=&session=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMR
Org= (4 January 2011). 
174 United Nations General Assembly. “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
Australia.” A/HRC/17/10. 24 March 2011.p.5. 
37 
 
adopted to protect vulnerable groups175 from discrimination and counter systematic 
racism.176  In response, to address racial intolerance and discrimination, the delegation 
announced that the government would appoint a race discrimination commissioner.177  
In addition to recommending further attention to incidents of racial crimes against 
migrants, the policy of mandatory detention reaped heavy criticism.  While it recognised 
Australia’s strong commitment to border control, the report invited Australia to review 
the effect of domestic legislation relating to mandatory detention and consider the wider 
implications of vulnerability to abuse and exploitation.  It was noted that detention 
should only occur where strictly necessary, and both accommodation and services should 
be regularly reviewed.  It was of particular concern that federal initiatives penalised 
irregular migrants and children and that they were detained for lengthy periods at remote 
locations.  This practice was encouraged to be discontinued and the closing of Christmas 
Island detention centre was suggested.  Additionally, wider rights protected under other 
international human rights instruments were noted, such as access to legal assistance and 
access to appropriate health care.178   
The report recommended that Australia honour all obligations under Article 31 (the right 
to seek asylum) and 33 (the principle of non-refoulement) of the Convention.   The 
processing of asylum-seekers' claims in accordance with the Refugee Convention and 
ensuring that the rights of all refugees and asylum-seekers are respected, including access 
to Australian refugee law, was recommended.   
Australia’s commitment and role in the region to combat trafficking and smuggling and 
addressing the growing challenge of irregular migration was recognised.179  The Bali 
Process initiative brought together thirty eight countries in the region at the Regional 
Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related 
Transnational Crime in Bali in February 2002.180  However, while Australia strengthens 
anti-terrorism measures to meet international counter-terrorism obligations, it was 
recommended that this not be at the cost of previously existing international human 
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rights obligations and humanitarian principles.181  It was also recommended that all fifty 
newly adopted pieces of legislation since 2001 be reviewed so that their application in 
practice is compliant with international obligations.    
In response to the recommendation that Australia enact a human rights bill which would 
ensure domestic and international consistencies prior to any legislative decision, Australia 
noted that while their domestic legal system recognises and protects many basic rights 
and freedoms, societal divisions existed in regards to a human rights charter or bill of 
rights.182  Currently, Australia is progressing a human rights framework which will require 
each new piece of legislation (introduced before Parliament) to be accompanied by an 
assessment of compatibility with international human rights obligations.183  The 
framework will also create a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights with a 
responsibility to provide greater scrutiny of legislation compliance with international 
obligations.     
 
Part IV. What compliance theory says about Australia’s challenges  
Realist theory 
Realist scholarship views international law as having little significance for state behaviour 
due to states being driven by their own political agenda based on power and national 
interest, thus making compliance capricious.  While this theory could be said to establish 
the rationale for all of the examples of Australia’s non-compliance to provisions of the 
Refugee Convention, it does not explain compliance.         
Radhika Whithana suggests that if compliance with international treaties did not matter, 
states would not go to the lengths they do to justify and rationalise why their behaviours 
are consistent with international law.184  Under the Pacific Solution, Australia amended 
significant pieces of domestic legislation which resulted in high levels of non-compliance 
to the Refugee Convention.  Territory which was formally part of Australia was legally 
removed from the Australian boundary so that when the Tampa asylum seekers arrived 
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on Christmas Island, Australia was not strictly in breach of the Refugee Convention 
obligations to process them under the same conditions as those who arrive onshore.  
While it was clearly a demonstration of Australia’s political agenda based on national 
interests, the length that Australia went to with the introduction and enactment of this 
legislation to get ‘around’ Convention obligations, illustrates the Convention has a level of 
pull.  Thus, realist theory does not provide a convincing argument that international law is 
irrelevant.   
Likewise, the enactment of legislative changes does not support the realist notion that 
domestic policies are simply consistent with international policy.  The amendments were 
a proactive measure by Australia.  States must amend and enact domestic legislation 
prior to ratification of the Refugee Convention or alternatively declare reservations where 
there are inconsistencies and compliance cannot legally be achieved.  The uptake of 
international humanitarian law into domestic governance also illustrates a notable level 
of state engagement and cooperation, rather than mere consistency, with international 
compliance.  Therefore, it provides little explanation for the level of compliance and 
commitment that Australia maintained during changing circumstances.       
Realist theory suggests that when Australia enters into an agreement with the 
Convention it maintains a high level of freedom over the level of compliance it 
demonstrates, and that engagement in cooperation exists solely where absolute gain is 
imminent.  Particularly, international law is viewed as allowing flexibility as there are few 
direct sanctions.  It could be perceived that Australia entered into agreement with 
Malaysia as a strategic ‘absolute gain’ favouring Australia because unprocessed asylum 
seekers would be removed from Australian responsibility in exchange for already 
processed and determined refugees which would have been accepted in through the 
yearly quota regardless.  This resulted in direct sanctions when the Malaysia solution was 
overruled by the Australian High Court and an immediate injunction was put in place. 
Realist theory would suggest that Australia ratified the Refugee Convention because it 
was in their best interest to do so.  However, the reality of irregular migration through 
mass population displacement is that it places significant financial, social and 
administrative pressures on the state, from initial processing through to integration and 
resettlement.  Australia would feel the financial and societal strain of the intake so it 
could easily be argued that what is essentially a humanitarian gesture is not in Australia’s 
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best interest.  While Australia has the highest refugee intake per capita, there are other 
nations party to the Refugee Convention which have a significantly higher population of 
refugees185 where state discretion of entry into territorial borders is severely limited.  
Nevertheless, Australia, and no state for that matter, has withdrawn from the 
Convention.    
Additionally, if the Convention was of little relevance, the amount of time, energy and 
resources put into shaping it and international law would be significantly less.186  There 
are 192 member states of the UN and 148 of these states are party to the Refugee 
Convention, Protocol or both.187   
Australia has also demonstrated a sense of obligation to comply with its responsibilities 
by directly engaging with the international normative system.  They are party to every 
core international human rights treaty and actively take part in the UPR, having 
responded positively to both UN and peer review on incorporating best practice 
measures.  One such measure was the development of a human rights framework to 
assess domestic legislative compliance with international human rights obligations.   
Examples of Australia’s non-compliance, particularly through its offshore processing 
initiatives, support elements of realist theory, as do statements which undermine the 
foundation of the Convention made by John Howard suggesting Australia can choose who 
comes to their shores and how they come.  However, realist theory fails to explain 
instances of compliance to the Convention and the sense of obligation to international 
human rights standards which Australia has demonstrated in other areas.    
Liberal theory 
Liberal theory suggests non-governmental actors have a significant role when discussing 
normative law.188  There are numerous Australian non-government actors on the ground 
which have internalised norms and play a large role in providing a check and balance 
mechanism as was seen in the court case submitted against the state’s agreement with 
Malaysia.189   The increase in non-state actors voicing concern against non-compliance 
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towards refugee protection has ensured this discussion makes it onto the political agenda 
and saw the state held accountable for its actions.  Whilst they may not have 
international authority they can and have been highly effective.    
While Australia demonstrates a high level of international cooperation, internalised 
norms and evidence to support the idea that “states do not make decisions; people do”, it 
also does not account for the high volume of discriminatory legislation and practices 
which violate provisions of the Refugee Convention and other human rights obligations 
under CERD, ICCPR, CAT and CRC.   
While Australia has had a history of discriminatory immigration policies it has also relied 
heavily on immigration.  Australia dismantled the White Australia Policy and signed CERD, 
in support of eliminating racial discrimination while it simultaneously stemmed the intake 
of refugees from Vietnam.  Australia was instrumental in establishing the UNHCR, yet 
refrained from voting on initial protection for refugees to avoid an increase of the intake 
of non-Caucasians.  These contradictions throughout Australian history are numerous.           
The dismantling of the White Australia Policy and the gradual uptake of more inclusive 
immigration policies, coupled with Australia being an original member of the Refugee 
Convention steering committee and supporting a number of international UN human 
rights instruments illustrates Australia has engaged with and incorporated at least to 
some degree the international normative system.  These norms were reflected in 
legislation and policy passed by Australian Parliament, elected by and representative of 
the Australian people.  Where the state has not demonstrated consistency with 
international rights norms, there was a willingness to make necessary changes for 
compliance to be met.190   
Despite this, Australia’s federal system presents practical challenges to compliance with 
Australia’s international human rights obligations, particularly with the assurance of 
human rights protections not being secured automatically with legislative changes.191 
This does not support Koh’s suggestion that when there are internalised international 
legal norms at the domestic level, there will be a conscious effort made by policy makers 
to not breach the Convention.  The violations seen were in part due to asylum seekers 
                                                             
190 Particularly at a high level including amendments to legislation and incorporation into policy making. 
191 United Nations General Assembly (2010) p.4. 
42 
 
and refugee issues becoming politicised and dominating the federal election in 2001 and 
again in 2010, and the construed definition of national identity.   
The liberal domestic theory that constitutional and political factors of states play a part in 
international relations focuses on a positive correlation between the two rather than a 
general model.192  Additionally, empirical findings suggest that liberal theory does not 
explain why democratic states with strong human rights ratings have lower international 
human rights treaty ratification rates than those with lesser ratings.193    
Due to this, there can be a tendency to assume rights based treaties are unlikely to make 
an actual difference in reality.  Others contend that they can improve respect for human 
rights, particularly through the internalisation of norms in more democratic countries and 
countries with an active rights conscious civil society.  Ratification alone rarely has an 
absolute effect on global human rights because implementation and enforcement are still 
required.  Neumayer suggests that an advance in human rights is more likely the more 
democratic the country is, and the more international non-governmental organizations its 
citizens participate in.  Conversely, in autocratic leadership with weak civil society, 
ratification can have limited effect and at times even be associated with increased rights 
violations, thus suggesting that there is no natural tendency to comply.194   
However, if there was not public pressure and the subsequent High Court decision, the 
offshore processing agenda in Australia could have been pushed ahead without direct 
sanctions and implemented globally as a standard model for offshore processing of 
asylum seekers elsewhere.  
Australia’s contradictions are partially summed up by Manne who noted that Australians 
do not like spontaneous arrival; a controlled arrival of the same number of asylum 
seekers is acceptable.   
Unlike realist theory, liberal theory can provide an insight into factors which drive 
Australia’s compliance.  However, while Australia demonstrates a high level of 
international cooperation, internalised norms and an influential civil society which holds 
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193 Moore (2003) p.881. See also Hathaway (2002) p.2001. 
194 Neumayer, Eric. “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005): 925-953. 
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the state accountable for its action, the theory does not account for discriminatory 
practices which contradict and violate a number of human rights obligations.   
Reputation theory 
While there are examples of Australia’s consciousness over its reputation particularly 
where there is an increased cost associated with non-compliance, reputation theory does 
not explain significant breaches seen under the offshore processing legislation.  
Reputation theory does not explain the internationally criticised policy of mandatory 
detention which not only violates the Refugee Convention but several other international 
obligations as well.    
Reputation theory suggests states are more likely to comply when there is greater 
transparency of a violation.  If no, or relatively few states, are likely to gain knowledge of 
a violation, it may prove influential in deciding whether to engage in non-compliance 
when it is in the state’s best interest.  Without other states’ knowledge of non-
compliance, there is no loss of reputation.  Australia responds to incidents which may 
tarnish its reputation.  There was a high cost of being seen to be intolerant of 
multiculturalism in 1996 when Pauline Hanson’s comments and sentiments were picked 
up internationally and labelled as racist, hate speech, and compared to Nazism.195  
Conscious of Australia’s international reputation and subsequently the potential effect on 
foreign trade, particularly with the Asian region, Howard spoke overtly in favour of 
mending international relations at regional forums whilst simultaneously quietly reducing 
funding internally for immigration and multi-cultural public services.196 
However, reputation is not always a driver towards compliance where there is high 
transparency and high cost associated with non-compliance.  The practice of mandatory 
detention has received significant international criticism and violates the Convention 
along with several other core human rights treaties.  While it was initiated a decade 
before the Pacific Solution highlighted violations, detention was not as transparent and 
was enacted with quieter international response initially.  Progressively Australia’s 
reputation for harsh detention policies resulted in much international criticism.197  As it 
                                                             
195 McAdam (2003). 
196 Skulan (2006) p.69.  In 1996 Howard merged the Office of Multicultural Affairs and the Department of 
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, without added funding.   
197 Particularly in Austria, the UK and the Netherlands.  See Human Rights Watch. “Not for Export: Why the 
International Community Should Reject Australia's Refugee Policies.” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper. 
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became more transparent through investigations into the detention centres, several 
improvements were made with some detainees having been given more rights, the 
policy, the only one of its kind, still exists and is discriminatory towards particular 
groups.198  However, Downs and Jones suggest that the reality is reputational sanctions, 
even total loss of reputation, may still not be enough to persuade a state to fully 
comply.199   
Reputation theory emphasises the benefits of membership with the international 
community and suggests higher levels of compliance exist with the development of 
regional organisations and regional cooperation.  While Australia has violated provisions 
of the Refugee Convention, it illustrated a high level of compliance to bilateral treaties 
and cooperation throughout the Pacific region.   Such initiatives included the Bali Process 
which saw high international participation, the Pacific Solution and processing centres in 
various offshore regions, and most recently buy in from Malaysia with the Malaysia 
Solution agreement.  However, these regional agreements have not adapted international 
human rights norms and instruments into their legal and policy frameworks.  While 
Simmons suggests that the implementation of human rights norms at a regional level can 
lead to further compliance as regional pressure can be more persuasive than 
international pressure for compliance,200 if bilateral agreements are initiated with 
countries which do not uphold the same level of protections, then compliance may not be 
higher due to regional cooperation alone.     
A strong human rights record is a relevant factor for Australia to maintain a positive 
international reputation.  Not honouring obligations can tarnish reputation as it 
demonstrates the state’s preparedness to breach obligations and not fulfil 
responsibilities.  Australia recognises this as stated through the UPR process and is thus 
implementing a human rights framework to illustrate the serious consideration that it 
pays to compliance with international obligations.   
                                                                                                                                                                                         
September 2002. http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/09/25/australian-refugee-policy-not-export (accessed 10 
December 2011). 
198 Unaccompanied children are no longer detained within the same environment and Australia has noted in 
their UPR report that the length of time in detention will be examined with the hope to implement a 90 day 
processing timeframe. 
199 Downs, George W. and Michael A. Jones. “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law.” The Journal 
of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002): p.95. 
200 Simmons (2009). 
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Whilst Australia has not moved significantly on mandatory detention, reputation pull 
certainly can be seen through international engagement.  Demonstrating a seriousness 
and commitment to upholding international responsibility with the Refugee Convention 
and other UN instruments is significant to international membership.  Jill Parker noted 
that an indication of strong human rights compliance in Europe aids chances of European 
Union membership, resulting in significant economic, political and security related 
benefits to the state.201  Recently admitted members like Poland, Hungary, Romania and 
the Czech Republic have made significant efforts towards compliance with human rights 
norms, where a number of states have been blocked or delayed from membership due to 
their lack of compliance.202  Some critics of the Convention have called for Australia to 
withdraw from the treaty.203  However, even if Australia were to follow the correct 
withdrawal procedure as set forth in the Convention, and uphold a high level of 
compliance, it still may endure a reputational loss for its actions.204   
In special circumstances, such as a national crisis, non-compliance is viewed differently.  
In the time of crisis, a state may be able to retain a positive reputation if at other times 
they are able to comply with their obligations.  Maintaining immigration control as a 
national security measure and the influx of displaced persons have both been used as a 
‘national crisis’ justification by Australia for offshore processing and subsequent violations 
to treaties.  The cost of non-compliance in this situation is in part accepted to some 
degree because regardless of the justification, other states are attentive to Australia’s 
offshore processing initiatives and have watched with anticipation.  They want to see 
whether a balance can be struck in maintaining Convention compliance through offshore 
processing as a solution to an increased number of asylum seekers and refugees within 
their territories.205 
Reputation theory alone does not explain Australia’s violations to the Convention and 
other international obligations, particularly given their unique stance on mandatory 
detention and the criticism received.  Where it is useful, is in addressing some drivers of 
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compliance to the Convention and international relations particularly where relations 
may be strained.      
Constructivist theory 
According to constructivist theory, all concepts and ideas are given a meaning and a value 
by social dialogue and interaction.  Commonly discussed concepts which deal with 
compliance to the Refugee Convention - power, sovereignty, compliance, norms - are 
transitory, as is the structure in which they present themselves.  Therefore, the theory 
would suggest that concepts discussed domestically within Australia in relation to not 
only the Refugee Convention but to refugees and asylum seekers – concepts of identity, 
nationalism, security, asylum, foreign, compliance – are determined by those involved in 
the dialogue.     
When discussing Australia’s discriminating policies in relation to violations of the 
Convention, it is evident that the construction of national identity within Australia has 
historically played a significant role.   Discriminatory attitudes and legislation from as 
early as the White Australia Policy, through to more recent discriminatory legislation 
under the Pacific Solution, suggests exclusionary policies were designed to protect the 
integrity of the state.  This integrity has been and continues to rely on the concept of 
national identity, and what it means (and looks like) to be Australian.  The panic of boats 
arriving with Vietnamese refugees illustrated strong sentiment towards this notion, and 
the ‘us’ became clearer by defining the ‘them’.     
The notion of national identity continues to change throughout Australian history 
influenced by dialogue and interactions.  Post 9/11, through global events and security 
discourse, national identity is construed to include another layer, that of national security.  
Election campaigning and subsequent legislation amendments occurred in the height of 
9/11 where the notion of securing the nation and territorial integrity received widespread 
public support within Australia.  This security discourse is deep seated and 
“borderphobia” is demonstrated by at least a subset of the Australian population as 
evidenced by Pauline Hanson’s 1998 campaign, and further demonstrated in the Sydney 
riots where non-white citizens, born in Australia, were targeted as the ‘other’.  
‘Unauthorised’ asylum became a central electoral issue for the last three Australian 
federal elections, evidence that the threat to national security and national values that 
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‘unauthorised’ asylum seeking present is influential for more than a minority of the 
Australian population. 
According to constructivist theory states engage in decision making based on rightfulness 
of what norms have come to define, and thus, tend to base decision making on this rather 
than on the consequences of compliance or, cost-benefit analysis.  It would appear that 
for Australia, rightfulness is often interpreted as protecting Australian citizens from a 
threat to national identity and security as a priority.  
This attitude can be seen with Australia’s practice of mandatorily detaining asylum 
seekers.  While this practice has a high reputational cost as it breaches several 
international obligations and has reaped much criticism internationally, the practice 
continues to exist.  Similarly, the hugely financial cost is also not a deterrent.  A Select 
Committee of the New South Wales Parliament costed alternatives to detention centres, 
such as home detention and transitional community housing, and found the alternatives 
to be much more economically efficient, and much more humane.206 
Likewise, the number of asylum seekers is construed to be relatively high, high enough to 
cause concern and fear when in fact, fewer refugees have been accepted into Australia 
today than twenty or even thirty years ago.207  
Constructivism cannot be examined in isolation of historical or political context.  
Throughout Australian history, the fear of loss of national identity has been a catalyst for 
immigration policy.  Discussions around national identity and later tied into security have 
paralleled discussions around ‘us’ and ‘them’ as seen with ‘Asian invasion’ and a panic of 
boats arriving with Vietnamese refugees, suspending visas for certain countries, and the 
construction of the terms ‘illegal’ and ‘unauthorised’ used to describe asylum seekers 
illustrates how concepts and systems and identity is construed through dialogue and 
social interactions.   
 
 
                                                             
206 Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Submission to the Joint Select 
Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention Network. September 2011. p.87. 
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Managerial theory 
To an extent Australia supports the managerial notion that if a state enters into an 
international agreement they are likely to comply with it.  They were involved in the 
establishment of the UNHCR and have demonstrated a sense of obligation by withholding 
declarations to the Convention and recently suggested a willingness to remedy at least 
some violations through a human rights framework.  However, the thought that 
compliance occurs because it is efficient and non-compliance is highly costly to the state 
does not appear to be a significant deterrent as seen with significant legislative changes 
under the Pacific Solution and the Malaysia proposal.   
While non-compliance to the Convention can be seen, compliance to regional treaties are 
a result of state interactions and cooperation where processes of justification, discourse 
and persuasion are played out as per managerial thought. 
Managerial theory argues that compliance stems not from fear of reputational loss but 
like liberal theory, the state proactively engages in a regional and international 
community and thus has a desire to maintain membership which strengthens compliance.  
It suggest that in the absence of a threat of enforcement, treaties would essentially be 
stronger due to state cooperation, yet this is not always the case as seen with Australia’s 
level of compliance.208         
Australia’s non-compliance with the Convention is in part a result of treaty language 
ambiguity and parameters of the treaty which place limitations on the capacity of states 
to carry out obligations as Chayes and Chayes suggest.   
While the Convention is an instrument for guidance and protection it does not detail each 
and every individual circumstance.  It was drafted to deal with a specific historical event.  
While the Protocol widened the scope by expanding the definition of refugee, it is still 
limiting in other respects.      
Whilst temporal and geographic limitations were removed with the Protocol, the scope of 
the Convention and definition of refugee has confining parameters.  Only individuals who 
seek asylum due to a fear of persecution on the ground of civil or political status fulfil 
                                                             
208 Downs, George W., David M. Rock, and Peter N. Barsoom. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good 
News About Cooperation?” In International Law and International Relations, by Beth A. Simmons and 
Richard H. Steinberg, 92-114. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
49 
 
criteria needed for international protection under the Convention.209  Status is 
determined on a threshold which includes a violation of human rights but does not 
include hardship or lack of opportunity.210   
James Hathaway suggests the historical context heavily influenced the evolution of the 
Convention by serving a strategic political objective by Western states through a mandate 
of civil and political rights; and intentionally not exposing Western vulnerability in 
mandating coverage of economic, social and cultural rights.211  Due to the failure to 
protect those whose socio-economic rights are at risk, Hathaway notes “the Convention 
adopted an incomplete and politically partisan human rights rationale”.212  
So while freedom from civil and political oppression is protected, individuals who are 
denied other rights as set forth in ICESCR for example; such things as access to welfare, 
education, and healthcare cannot claim protection under the Convention.  This critique is 
becoming more commonplace as higher instances of international migration are 
occurring, particularly persons from developing nations who seek protection due to 
natural disasters, internal state conflict and economic crises.213  UN Conventions seek to 
protect basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights so that individuals are 
able to have an adequate standard of living internationally.  Though the first declaration 
of human rights was drawn in 1948, Donnelly suggests it took over forty years to 
significantly gain traction for economic, social and cultural rights due to conscious 
political decisions to overtly exercise sovereignty.214 
States have raised concern that the language of the Convention is too restrictive when 
global organisations and non-state actors cannot be held accountable for acts committed 
which fall outside the parameter of the definition.  Thus, it has drawn criticism that it is 
too unforgiving in a non-uniform world and too constricting whereby there is no ability 
for it to evolve as needed due to changes in circumstances, globalisation and political 
shifts.   
                                                             
209 Including those who have been disenfranchised from their state of residence due to race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a group or political opinion. 
210 Hathaway (1991) p.vi. 
211 Hathaway (1991) p.6.  “The strategic dimension of the definition comes from successful efforts of 
Western states to give priority in protection matters to persons whose flight was motivated by pro-Western 
political values.” Thus, exposing the Soviet blocs vulnerable political regime.   
212 Ibid, p.8. 
213 Ibid, p.10. 
214 Donnelly (2003). 
50 
 
The General Assembly has passed resolutions to remedy such instances.  Expanding the 
exclusions in Article 1(F) is an example of this where the General Assembly passed a 
resolution on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism which replicated the 
language of the Convention, asking states to consider whether terrorist acts had been 
engaged in prior to the granting of asylum.215  Guzman and Meyer (2010) note that the 
main intention of the resolution was to expand states’ understanding of the ‘exceptions’ 
category in the Convention.  Where a state may have struggled between complying with 
Articles 1(A)-(C) and a desire to turn down an application based on involvement in 
terrorism, the resolution would bring the two in line so that compliance could be met.216  
These distinctions and differing approaches to defining refugee still exist today, with the 
Convention definition being a burden in some cases and limiting in others.  Yet while the 
Convention does not aim to address the magnitude of factors which cause involuntary 
migration, Hathaway notes that a generous interpretation of the Convention can meet 
the needs of at least the most acutely at risk populations outside borders of their own 
nation.217  Where the Convention may be seen to be limiting in either scope or ambiguity, 
it does call for a level of interpretation to be carried out in good faith with the philosophy 
that was intended at the drafting of the Convention and UDHR. 
Chayes and Chayes suggest that a strict compliance is unnecessary so long as the 
provisions of the treaty are maintained to an acceptable level as determined by the 
international community.  Though non-compliance can exist and shall not automatically 
be assumed to signify a complete loss of protection and safeguard, Australia’s non-
compliance with the Refugee Convention occurs when protections are not provided in 
legislation or policy.  Not only did Australia violate several provisions, they attempted to 
make an agreement with Malaysia, a non-signatory to the Refugee Convention where 
protections such as non-refoulement and non-discrimination would not be guaranteed 
and a country internationally known for limited human rights protections. 
Circumstances can change after an agreement is drawn as seen with further population 
displacement after World War II and the need for the Protocol.  Chayes and Chayes argue 
that well developed treaties have the capability to evolve to meet the needs of shifting 
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interests.  This point is testing the Convention currently with some calling for Australia to 
withdraw. 
Australia supports the managerial notion that despite violations, they have maintained 
their membership and they have invested a great deal into compliance of the Convention.  
Managerial theory does not provide insight into non-compliance based on cost as a 
deterrent.  Offshore processing and detention for asylum seekers and refugees for 
example, is highly costly to the state.  
--- 
While no single theory of compliance can explain Australia’s level of compliance to the 
Convention, collectively they give a strong insight into the driving factors of compliance.  
Realist compliance theory can explain two instances of Australia’s non-compliance with 
the Refugee Convention, namely legislation under the Pacific Solution and mandatory 
detention. Realist theory does not however, explain drivers of compliance.     
Similarly, Australia has demonstrated that occasionally reputational pull is influential as 
seen through strategic plans such as initiating a human rights framework to better ensure 
compliance.  However, given their unique stance on mandatory detention and the 
criticism received, a tarnished reputation is not always a consideration.  
There is much support that Australia operates in an international normative framework 
on some level, as seen with the ratification of the Convention and other human rights 
treaties.  However, where contradictions expose themselves in the violations seen 
through discriminatory policies and legislation, constructivist theory can explain these 
breaches through Australia’s self-constructed notion of national identity which at times 
paradoxes the normative drive to comply.    
Australia has demonstrated that the parameters of the Convention can at times place a 
heavy burden on the state, supporting Managerial theory.  However, no state has 
withdrawn from the Convention which suggests that though it was designed in the 
aftermath of specific event, it still has relevance today. 
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Conclusion 
Australia is in violation of a number of obligations it has commitment to under the 
Refugee Convention, with many stemming from more recent policies and legislative 
amendments around offshore processing initiatives such as the Pacific Solution and the 
Malaysia Solution.  The legislation discriminates against asylum seekers by undermining 
the fundamental principle of the Convention, the right to seek asylum and discrimination 
based on method of arrival.  Various pieces of legislation are subsequently found to be 
discriminatory with provisions in other international human rights treaties to which 
Australia is party, such as ICCPR, CRC, CAT and CERD.  The practice of mandatory 
detention and lack of protection to ensure non-refoulement are considered significant 
levels of breach.  Australia defends its position using three justifications: the sovereign 
right to determine entry based on border control, national identity and security.   
This research examined the violations of the Convention in a historical, legal and political 
context to better understand the dynamics and factors of compliance.  An insight into the 
motivating factors of state compliance with international human rights instruments can 
not only improve legal protections for a vulnerable group of persons internationally, it can 
also provide a catalyst for ensuring an evolving rhetoric addresses the delicate balance of 
providing international protection to asylum seekers and refugees.  Particularly because 
one of the most common challenges to implementation and compliance with any 
international instrument is that domestic legislation must comply with the instrument for 
the provisions to be carried out.  Once these protections are implemented, enforcement 
needs to occur.  Human rights protections through international instruments not only 
depend on the state for implementation, they must also become part of the dialogue of 
institutions and civil society worldwide. 
Whilst the Convention affirms certain human rights standards, it also encourages the 
promotion of sound, equitable, humane and lawful conditions to be applied in good faith.  
Thus, when Australia amends domestic legislation essentially to get around obligations to 
the Convention and thus still be seen to comply in a strict sense, it does not uphold the 
philosophy of the treaty, which it has ratified. 
While tenets of all of the compliance theories could be seen, not one of the theories is 
able to capture and adequately represent Australia’s level of non-compliance on its own.  
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Elements of the theories discussed provide insight to a larger picture.  Two highly 
influential drivers of compliance in the Australian case study can be explained through 
both constructivist and liberal theories of compliance.  Civil society and non-state actors 
ensure that the state is held accountable to international obligations, while those 
obligations and level of compliance is influenced by Australia’s constructed definition of 
national identity.   
Whilst the Refugee Convention focuses on the normative discussion of advocating and 
protecting the fundamental rights of vulnerable individuals, it is competing with a deep 
political and social history of immigration policy based on the fears of an immigration 
invasion shaking up and altering Australian national identity.  It is not just Australia where 
the fear of immigration invasion is perpetuated.  Similar concerns are raised in Europe 
and the United States. 
Non-compliance in the name of the Convention’s inflexibility does not seem sufficient as 
it would be impossible for a state to comply only with a treaty that met every possible 
contingency since one cannot anticipate every possible circumstance.  Whist the 
prominent goal for human rights advocates is full enjoyment of human rights for all, the 
question remains as to whether the UN instruments are in fact improving the enjoyment 
of human rights. 
As we have seen, absolute compliance in the grander scheme may be indicative of very 
little when discussing treaty impact on state behaviour as non-compliance can alter state 
behaviour.  Therefore, the effectiveness of treaties may not be found in dissecting 
compliance theory but by focusing further study on measuring human rights on the 
ground, as this may paint a clearer, more accurate picture as to whether human rights are 
achieved and enjoyed.    
Further research into compliance could include tracking the relationship of compliance 
with the Refugee Convention amongst states, particularly liberal democracies by looking 
at variables which affect compliance decision making.  It may be that varying theories of 
compliance illustrate little more than that it is a complex world of vast differences and 
significant human rights inequalities. 
Analysis of actual human rights enjoyment could be further studied, because as Hathaway 
notes, compliance is not necessarily indicative of protection.  It is important to 
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understand a state’s relationship with international human rights instruments.  If one is to 
engage in the international human rights discussion, it is essential to understand if human 
rights are enjoyed in the state through human rights indicators that assess the effect that 
compliance has in relation to the Refugee Convention.  Further recommendations could 
be made if it were determined that a desired level of compliance had not been met.  As 
Hathaway has noted, statistical evidence shows that ratification does not automatically 
generate strong levels of actual compliance to human rights protections domestically.  
Such research would be significant not only in the context of globalisation and increased 
population displacement but also because of the incredible interrelatedness between the 
human rights regime and international relations.  Indicators of compliance do not 
measure to what extent protections are enjoyed.  Compliance indicators which reveal a 
state’s violation against human rights will expose the true level of enjoyment of rights.   
Human rights indicators could prove to take the thermometer of human rights out of the 
shade to give a more honest reading of human rights enjoyment in states, than sole 
examination of compliance to the Convention.   
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